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1. Introduction
On July 5, 2012, the United Nations Human Rights Council
("HRC") adopted a resolution to protect human rights online.'
This UN resolution, the first of its kind, was backed by more than
seventy member and non-member states, including China.2 The
t B.A., International Comparative Studies, Duke University, 2011; J.D. Candidate,
University of North Carolina School of Law, 2014. 1 would like to thank my family and
friends for their support and my Note & Comment Editor Daniel Hinson for his editorial
suggestions.
I Matthias Kettemann, UN Human Rights Council Confirms that Human Rights
Apply to the Internet, EJIL: TALK! (July 23, 2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/un-human-
rights-council-confirms-that-human-rights-apply-to-the-internet/.
2 Id.
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Resolution itself does not have any enforcement powers and
cannot punish noncompliant countries.' Although many laud the
resolution as "[a] [v]ictory for the Internet,"" it is merely the first
step in upholding human rights on the Internet.5
The Internet has become an increasingly important means
through which individuals receive and impart information.6
However, the increasing importance and prevalence of Internet use
has also spurred efforts to restrict the use of the Internet on
grounds ranging from protecting children to preserving national
security.' In some countries, the use of the Internet is restricted or
censored through Internet filters to such a degree that fundamental
freedoms, such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of
information, may be curtailed.' The lack of protection for
fundamental freedoms due to restriction of Internet use persists
despite the recent HRC resolution.9 These Internet-use freedoms
are difficult to protect because content crosses boundaries, and the
Internet is subject to different regulations in different countries.'"
As such, enforcing protection for fundamental rights relating to
Internet use in more repressive regimes is difficult, because these
regimes have their own way of dealing with such issues."
3 See Human Rights Council Res. 20, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment
of Human Rights on the Internet, 20th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (June 29, 2012)
[hereinafter H.R.C. Res. 20].
4 Carl Bildt, Op-Ed., A Victory for the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/opinion/carl-bildt-a-victory-for-the-
internet.html?_r-2.
5 See Kettemann, supra note 1.
6 See UNESCO, FREEDOM OF CONNECTION, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: THE
CHANGING LEGAL AND REGULATORY ECOLOGY SHAPING THE INTERNET, 8 (2011),
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001915/191594e.pdf.
7 See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends
and Challenges to the Right of All Individuals to Seek, Receive and Impart Information
and Ideas of All Kinds Through the Internet, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/27, 25 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur].
8 See id. 26. For example, China filters and blocks access to Internet websites
"containing key terms such as 'democracy' and 'human rights."' Id 129.
9 See Bildt, supra note 4.
10 Lyombe Eko, Many Spiders, One Worldwide Web: Towards a Typology of
Internet Resolution, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 445,447 (2001).
See id. at 475-77 (describing the "gateway" model of Internet regulation that
exists in more repressive regimes).
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In order to combat the problem of enforcement, the HRC
should look to the European Union's example in dealing with
Internet freedom and Internet censorship within the framework of
Harold Koh's "transnational legal process." 2  Koh, a renowned
legal scholar, explained that transnational legal process and its
associated five factors-"power; self-interest or rational choice;
liberal explanations based on rule-legitimacy or political identity;
communitarian explanations; and legal process explanations""-
help explain how and why nations obey international law.14 Koh's
transnational legal process is applicable to this discussion and will
be examined further in this paper. Furthermore, the European
Union's actions regarding Internet freedom, when considered
within the framework of Koh's transnational legal process, may
serve as a model for the HRC. By implementing some of the steps
the European Union has taken or attempted, the HRC will move
beyond the idealistic, albeit toothless, Resolution and take a major
step forward in protecting fundamental human rights on the
Internet.
II. United Nations Human Rights Council's Resolution On
Protecting Internet Freedom
According to United Nations Special Rapporteur Frank LaRue,
the Internet is a "key means" through which individuals may
exercise their freedom of expression." The Internet not only
enables individuals to "exercise their right to freedom of opinion
and expression," but it also acts as an "enabler of other
fundamental human rights," "such as the right to education [and]
freedom of association and assembly[,]" 6 the right to cast
informed votes and to "hold governments and other public
institutions accountable." In general, protecting freedom of
expression is necessary because "the free flow of ideas is critical
12 Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1399 (1999), available at www.repository.law.indiana.edu/
ilj/vol74/iss4/9/.
13 Id. at 1401 (emphasis removed).
14 See id. at 1401-02; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
15 Special Rapporteur, supra note 7, 20.
16 Id. T 22.
7 UNESCO, supra note 6, at 10.
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to democratic processes and institutions."" Ensuring access to the
Internet effectively protects the freedom of expression.19
Moreover, the right to freedom of expression must not be
restricted "other than to the extent permitted by Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights as interpreted by
European Court of Human Rights." 20 Thus, censoring the Internet
could amount to prohibiting individuals who desire to inform and
be informed from accessing the Internet, thereby violating the
aforementioned rights and freedoms.
Prior to the adoption of the HRC's recent resolution on
protecting fundamental rights on the Internet, the UN had not
explicitly linked the Internet to the notion of "human rights" 2' and
had only implied that access to the Internet is a human right.22
18 Id. Note that some censorship, such as censorship of child pornography, may be
positive.
19 See EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE
MEDIA: STANDARD-SETTING BY THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS 213
(Susanne Nikoltchev & Tarlach McGonagle eds., 2011), available at http://www.obs.
coe.int/oeapubl/legal/ebookpace.pat.en.
20 Id.; European Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-
4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/ConventionENGWEB.pdf [hereinafter European
Convention] ("The exercise of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary.").
21 Kettemann, supra note I ("That the Internet, and the [information and
communication technologies ("ICTs")] more generally, are drivers of development has
already been previously confirmed by the General Assembly. In its resolution on ICTs
for development (U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/184), however, the General Assembly manages
to not include a single reference to 'human rights' in over seven pages.").
22 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 19, (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]
("Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.") (emphasis
added); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Rep. 102-23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] ("Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers ... through any ...
media of his choice.").
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Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("Universal Declaration") protects an individual's right to
"freedom of opinion and expression," including the "freedom to
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers," as a basic human right.2 3 Even though this provision
does not explicitly mention freedom of expression online,2 4 the
phrase "through any media" presumably "anticipated
developments in information and communication technologies ...
and growing internationalization of content flows."25 Similarly,
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") protects an individual's "right to hold opinions
without interference" and "right to freedom of expression,"
including "freedom to seek, receive and impart information
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of his choice."2 6 Unlike
the Universal Declaration, however, Article 19 of the ICCPR
limits the freedom of opinions and expression under certain
circumstances, stating that such protections shall not extend
beyond what is necessary "for the respect of the rights or
reputations of others" and "for the protection of national security
or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals."2 7
The ICCPR also requires that "any regulations passed that limit
free speech must be (1) prescribed by law; (2) implemented in
order to protect the rights or reputations of others or to safeguard
national security; and (3) necessary to achieve that purpose."2 8
States generally agree that they are obliged to prohibit child
pornography; materials that are discriminatory or hostile to certain
nations, races, or religion; genocide-promoting materials; and
terrorism-inciting materials. 29 However, because the "actual scope
of the right is delineated by each nation, causing variations from
23 Universal Declaration, supra note 22., art. 19.
24 See id.
25 Kettemann, supra note 1.
26 ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 19 TT 1-2.
27 Id. art. 19 13.
28 Jessica Bauml, It's a Mad, Mad Internet: Globalization and the Challenges
Presented by Internet Censorship, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 697, 707 (2011).
29 See Kettemann, supra note 1; see also Eko, supra note 10, at 458.
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country to country,""o some states have interpreted this provision
broadly to uphold their Internet censorship.3 1
Additionally, the UN International Telecommunication Union
has implicitly accepted the right to freedom of expression on the
Internet since 2003.32 The UN Commission on Human Rights has
also issued a resolution outlining instances in which a state is
precluded from imposing restrictions on rights under ICCPR
Article 19. Governments are not permitted to restrict:
(a) Discussion of government policies and political debate,
reporting on human rights, government activities and corruption
in government, engaging in peaceful demonstrations or political
activities, including for peace and democracy, or expression of
opinion and dissent, religion or belief;
(b) The free flow of information and ideas, including practices
such as the unjustifiable banning or closing of publications or
other media and the abuse of administrative measures and
censorship;
(c) Access to or use of modem telecommunications
technologies, including radio, television and the Internet;
(d) Journalists in situations of armed conflict.34
However, the HRC's resolution is the first to expressly state
that individuals have a right to freedom of expression on the
Internet.35 The real impetus for the Resolution was the UN Special
Rapporteur Frank LaRue's aforementioned report on the
protection of the freedom of expression on the Internet.3 6 The
report discussed the ways in which freedom of expression on the
Internet was restricted, and called upon the states to ensure "as
little restriction as possible to the flow of information via the
30 Bauml, supra note 28, at 707.
31 See Aisha Husain, Framing the International Standard for the Global Flow of
Information on the Internet, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 35, 36-37 (2008-09) (providing
that China has interpreted "national security" and "public order" broadly in order to
highly regulate the Internet).
32 See Special Rapporteur, supra note 7, T 63.
33 Commission on Human Rights Res. 2003/42, The Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, 9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/42, (Apr. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/43f3l338c.html.
34 Id.
35 See H.R.C. Res. 20, supra note 3.
36 See Special Rapporteur, supra note 7.
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Internet, except in few, exceptional, and limited circumstances
prescribed by international human rights law." 37 Taking LaRue's
discussion into account, the Resolution provides the following:
1. Affirms that the same rights that people have offline must also
be protected online, in particular freedom of expression, which
is applicable regardless of frontiers and through any media of
one's choice, in accordance with Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights;
2. Recognizes the global and open nature of the Internet as a
driving force in accelerating progress towards development in its
various forms;
3. Calls upon all States to promote and facilitate access to the
Internet and international cooperation aimed at the development
of media and information and communications facilities in all
countries;
4. Encourages special procedures to take these issues into
account within their existing mandates, as applicable;
5. Decides to continue its consideration of the promotion,
protection and enjoyment of human rights, including the right to
freedom of expression, on the Internet and in other technologies,
as well as of how the Internet can be an important tool for
development and for exercising human rights, in accordance
with its programme of work.38
Additionally, this report referenced the rights, especially the
freedom of expression, which are also enumerated in the
Universal Declaration, and "relevant international human rights
treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights."39
37 Jillian York, U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution on Internet and Human
Rights a Step in the Right Direction, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (July 26,
2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/07/un-human-rights-council-resolution-
internet-and-human-rights-step-right-direction.
38 See H.R.C. Res. 20, supra note 3.
39 Id.; see also Universal Declaration, supra note 22, art. 19 and accompanying
text ("[The] freedom to hold opinions .. . receive and impart information and ideas
through any media."); see also ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 19 and accompanying text
("[The] right to hold opinions without interference . . . [and] freedom of expression,
[including the] freedom to seek, receive, and impart information.").
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
III. When Considered Within the Framework of Harold Koh's
Transnational Legal Process, May Serve as a Model for the
Human Rights Council
A. Ineffectiveness of the Resolution by Itself
Although the Resolution is a positive first step towards
ensuring the protection of freedom of expression on the Internet, it
is nonetheless an ineffective measure because it is non-binding.4 0
Universal human rights instruments, including "declarations,
principles, guidelines, standard rules and recommendations," are
non-binding, but have "undeniable moral force and provide
practical guidance to States in their conduct. "' Resolutions,
however, generally refer to "recommendations and decisions, both
of which have a vague and variable meaning in the Charter."4 2
The International Court of Justice typically uses the "expression
'decision' for binding resolutions and 'recommendation' for non-
binding ones." 43  Binding resolutions are "capable of creating
obligations," but declarations "in theory only interpret the Charter
or assert the content of general international law" and arguably
could constitute "a sub-category of recommendations." 4 4  In
general, however, resolutions are considered only
recommendations, and thus, not legally binding. 45 Thus, because
the Resolution at issue here is not binding, it cannot enforce its
provisions when a state is noncompliant.4 6 In fact, the HRC
acknowledges that the Resolution merely recognizes a right.47 As
40 Somini Sengupta, U.N. Affirms Internet Freedom as a Basic Right, N.Y. TIMES
BITS (July 6, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/so-the-united-
nations-affirms-internet-freedom-as-a-basic-right-now-what/.
41 International Human Rights Law, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://kosovo.ohchr.org/?cid=2,1 I (last visited Apr.
10, 2013).
42 Marko Divac Oberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security
Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 879,
880 (2006), available at http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/16/5/879.full#fn-2.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Robert Beckman & Dagmar Butte, Introduction to International Law,
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION, 5, http://www.ilsa.org/jessup
/intlawintro.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2013).
46 See Sengupta, supra note 40.
47 See Commission on Human Rights Res. 2003/42, supra note 33.
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such, the HRC leaves the onus on individual states to protect the
right to freedom of expression online.
Some argue that the Resolution may be effective for "public
shaming" purposes becuase states want to maintain a "positive
reputation for cooperation."' The idea is that countries want to
have a "positive reputation for cooperation" in the international
community so as to bolster goodwill and have "a continuous and
active voice in global policymaking." 4 9 Notably, even powerful
and repressive regimes like China buy into this notion to a certain
degree.o However, some countries have less incentive to comply
with non-binding international agreements and resolutions because
they may not need a positive reputation for cooperation due to
their economic and political strengths or their indifference to the
international community."' Therefore, the Resolution, by itself,
will likely be ineffective in upholding human rights on the
Internet.
B. Harold Koh's "Transnational Legal Process"
Applying Harold Koh's "transnational legal process" is
particularly helpful to understanding how the protection for the
fundamental rights relating to the Internet may be enforced.
Although Koh acknowledges that the transnational legal process of
enforcing international law may be imperfect, he also
acknowledeges that it "sometimes has [had] its successes, which
gives us reason not to ignore that process, but to try to develop and
nurture it."5 The transnational legal process involves: "the
institutional interaction whereby global norms of international
human rights law are debated, interpreted, and ultimately
internalized by domestic legal systems."53 Stated differently,
international human rights are enforced "through a transnational
48 Katherine Tsai, How to Create International Law: The Case of Internet
Freedom in China, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 401, 414 (2011).
49 Id. at 415.
5 See id at 416 ("China has been 'seeking to expand its influence' in the
international community by pursuing a 'larger voice in international organizations ...
[such as] the International Monetary Fund ... [and] has also begun to expand its
international peacekeeping efforts."').
51 See id
52 Koh, supra note 12, at 1399.
5 3 Id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
legal process of institutional interaction, interpretation of legal
norms, and attempts to internalize those norms into domestic legal
systems."5 4
Koh begins by stating that the enforcement of international
human rights law should be considered within the context of the
broader question of why "nations obey international law of any
kind. .. . "" He explores five rationales that together "help
explain why nations obey international law""-"power; self-
interest or rational choice; liberal explanations based on rule-
legitimacy or political identity; communitarian explanations; and
legal process explanations."" The power rationale refers to the
idea that nations only comply with international law because a
more powerful nation coerced the weaker nation into
compliance." Under the self-interest rationale, nations decide to
follow international law when it serves their self-interest. 59
Liberal theory based on rule-legitimacy refers to nations
complying with international law because they feel that it is
legitimate.6 0 Liberal theory based on political identity refers to the
idea that whether nations comply with international law depends
on "the extent to which their political identity is based on liberal
democracy. Koh notes that some scholars look to European
Union law as an example, arguing that the "European system of
human rights works because it is largely composed of liberal
democracies."6 2 Under the communitarian rationale, nations obey
international law because the law reflects the "values of the
international society of which they are a part."63 Koh discusses
two types of legal process explanations-horizontal and vertical.
The horizontal legal process deals with state level interaction,
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1401.
56 Id. at 1407.
57 Id. at 1401.
58 See Koh, supra note 12, at 1402.
59 Id. at 1402-03 (providing that states engage in a cost-benefit analysis in
determining whether to comply with international law).
60 Id. at 1404.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1405.
63 Id. at 1406.
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whereas the vertical explanation deals with interactions between
"the international and domestic legal systems."64 Koh notes that
by combining all five factors, "from power to legal process . . . we
also move from external enforcement of legal rules to internal
obedience with legal rules."6 5
Taking the five explanations into account, international human
rights are first enforced through the lens of the "'vertical' story of
human rights enforcement." 6 6 The vertical story of enforcement
deals with "a transnational legal process that includes a different
set of actors, fora, and transactions."67 The actors who are most
relevant to the transnational legal process in terms of human rights
are "transnational norm entrepreneurs, governmental norm
sponsors, transnational issue networks, interpretive communities
and law declaring fora, bureaucratic compliance procedures, and
issue linkages among issue areas."6' Koh therefore shows that the
process of internalizing human rights norms begins with the above
actors, rather than with the individual states. 69  These non-state
actors help establish "transnational issue networks" to spur
discussion among similar actors at the "domestic, regional, and
international levels."o The actors, or "norm entrepreneurs," then
try to find allies among those in the bureaucracy who would act as
their "governmental norm sponsors."" Then, all of these actors
seek fora "to declare both general norms of international law and
specific interpretations of those norms in particular
circumstances."72 Finally, the governments try to internalize
interpretations of the norms iterated by the "global interpretative
64 Koh, supra note 12, at 1406.
65 Id. at 1407.
66 Id. at 1409.
67 Id
68 Id. (quoting Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 HoUSTON L. REv. 623, 647-70 (1998)).
69 See id. at 1409-10 (noting prominent non-state actors, including the Dalai Lama
and Aung Sang Suu Kyi).
70 Koh, supra note 12, at 1410.
7' Id
72 Id. (providing that fora include "treaty regimes; domestic, regional, and
international courts; ad hoc tribunals; domestic and regional legislatures; executive
entities; international publicists; and nongovernmental organizations").
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
community" into their internal structures." Although this process
is not foolproof, it helps explain why most nations comply with
some of the international norms that exist today.
C. European Union and the Freedom ofExpression on the
Internet
The European Union has not fully established a specific set of
guidelines with which to deal with restrictions on Internet use
among member states and non-member states. However, the
European Union has made concerted efforts to protect
fundamental freedoms relating to the Internet, which, if viewed in
the context of Harold Koh's transnational legal process, hint at a
positive, albeit gradual, progress in norm-internalization.
The European Union has acknowledged the nexus between the
Internet and human rights on several occasions.74 In 2005, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the
Declaration on Human Rights and the Rule of Law in the
Information Society. 5 The Declaration recognized that "limited or
no access" to the Internet could strip individuals of their human
rights and that the "freedom of expression, information and
communication" should be protected online and offline alike,
except under the restrictions provided for in the European
Covenant of Human Rights Article 10.76 The Declaration further
added that forms of censorship should be prohibited and that the
"civil society, the private sector and other interested stakeholders"
should cooperate. 7  Finally, the document referred to the various
responsibilities of stakeholders to help regulate and deal with the
development of the Internet. Notably, the stakeholders may
include "Council of Europe Member States; civil society; private
sector actors and the Council of Europe."7 9
73 Id. at 1411.
74 See, e.g., Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on Human Rights and the
Rule of Law in the Information Society, CM(2005)56 (May 13, 2005) [hereinafter
Declaration on the Rule of Law in the Information Society], available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=849061.
75 Declaration on Rule ofLaw in Information Society, supra note 74.
76 Id; see also European Convention, supra note 20, art. 10.
77 Declaration ofRule ofLaw in Information Society, supra note 74.
78 See id
79 Id.
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The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to
member states on measures promoting respect for freedom of
expression and information with regard to Internet filters also
acknowledges certain fundamental rights regarding the Internet.80
The Recommendation reaffirms a commitment to the
"fundamental right to freedom of expression and to receive and
impart information and ideas without" restriction."' The document
also acknowledges that forbidding access to the Internet content
"may constitute a restriction on freedom of expression and access
to information" online and that these restrictions are subject to
"Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Convention of Human
Rights and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human
Rights."8 2 European Union member states are also reminded to
develop measures to prevent censorship and encourage the
"private sector and civil society" to develop standards "to promote
transparency and the provision of information, . . . and services
concerning ... the blocking of access to and filtering of content
and services with regard to the right to receive and impart
information."" This Recommendation focuses on bringing
together "all relevant private and public sector stakeholders" to
help implement the provisions set out in the Recommendation.84
On September 21, 2011, the Council of Europe issued the
Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet
Governance Principles ("DCM")." The DCM links "globality,
80 See Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on Measures to Promote the Respect for Freedom of Expression and Information
with Regard to Internet Filters (Mar. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Recommendation to Promote
Freedom of Expression], available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/
t-cy/T-CY%20CMRec(2008)6%20E.pdf.
81 Declaration Decl-20.02.2008/1 of the Committee of Ministers on Protecting the
Dignity, Security and Privacy of Children on the Internet, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND THE MEDIA: STANDARD-SETTING BY THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE'S COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS 251 (Susanne Nikoltchev & Tarlach McGonagle eds., 2011), available at
http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/legal/ebookcommitteeministers-coe.pdfen.
82 See Recommendation to Promote Freedom of Expression, supra note 80, at 220.
83 See Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)II of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on Promoting Freedom of Expression and Information in the New
Information and Communications Environment (Sept. 26, 2007), available at
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id= 188541.
84 See Recommendation to Promote Freedom ofExpression, supra note 80.
85 See Declaration on the Rule of Law in the Information Society, supra note 74.
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openness, and other architectural principles of the Internet and
human rights."8 6 The DCM notes that the "global ... nature of the
Internet" is based upon the notion of "universal access."87
Furthermore, an "open Internet" includes "open standards and an
open network."" The "open standards" and the "open network" of
the Internet are essentially "key architecture principles of the
Internet that underlie the Human Rights Council's commitments to
its openness."89 While the DCM, under principle 7, acknowledges
that the "day-to-day management .. . should remain
decentralized," it also notes that the "[tiraffic management
measures which have an impact on the enjoyment of fundamental
rights and freedoms . . . must meet the requirements of
international law."90 Thus, the DCM lays out a link between the
Internet and human rights.
Also on September 21, 2011, the Council of Europe adopted
the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member
states on the protection and promotion of the universality,
integrity, and openness of the Internet. Some notable provisions in
the Recommendation provide that the right to freedom of
expression "applies to both online and offline activities, regardless
of frontiers," and that "[i]n a Council of Europe context, its
protection should be ensured in accordance with" the European
Convention of Human Rights and the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights." Additionally, the Recommendation
suggests that "states should, jointly, and in consultation with
relevant stakeholders" formulate plans to respond to the
interference with the Internet.92 The Recommendation, thus,
endorses a multi-stakeholder approach.93  According to Jan
Malinowski, the head of the Media and Information Society at the
86 Kettermann, supra note 1.
87 Id.
88 Id
89 Id.
90 Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on Internet Governance Principles,
7, 9, (Sep. 21, 2011), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDocjsp?id= 835773.
91 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the
Protection and Promotion of the Universality, Integrity and Openness of the Internet,
CM/Rec(2011)8, (Sept. 21, 2011) (hereinafter Recommendation on Openness].
92 Id. 11.2.
93 See id.
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Council of Europe, "this was the first time governments had
acknowledged they had a legal responsibility to protect the
[I]nternet-even beyond their own borders." 94
Most importantly, the language of Article 10 of the European
Convention of Human Rights resembles that of Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration and Article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 10
provides that the right to freedom of expression includes "freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers." 95 The Convention also permits limitations of this right:
[A]s are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.96
In determining whether limits on the exercise of the freedom
of expression on the Internet are proper, the European Court of
Human Rights considers three elements: (1) the restriction "must
have a basis in the national law"; (2) "the law must be accessible";
and (3) a person should be able to understand and foresee the
law's consequences for him, and be "compatible with the rule of
law." 97 Furthermore, even if the restriction has a basis in the
national law, the basis must be designed for one of the purposes
specified in the Constitution and the European Covenant of
Human Rights.98 Thus, the European Union has acknowledged
that freedom of expression on the Internet should be protected
under its law, although it has failed to adopt comprehensive and
94 Mark Ballard, Council of Europe Countries Agree to Protect Internet Freedom
of Expression, COMPUTER WEEKLY, Sep. 26, 2011, http://www.computerweekly.com/
news/2240105693/Council-of-Europe-countries-agree-to-protect-internet-freedom-of-
expression.
95 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 10.
96 Id.
97 Yaman Akdeniz, Report of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
on Turkey and Internet Censorship, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE, 25, available at http://www.osce.org/fom/41091.
98 See id. at 26; see also European Convention, supra note 20, art. 10. and text
accompanying note 95.
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legally binding guidelines on how this should be accomplished.
The European Court of Human Rights recently issued a
chamber judgment99 on a complaint arising from restriction of
access to the Internet, while another case Jankovskis v. Lithuania
is still pending."oo In Yildirim v. Turkey, Ahmet Yildirim, a
Turkish citizen, sued Turkey on the ground that Turkey violated
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights when it
blocked access to Yildirim's own website.'o' Turkey had blocked
access to all Google sites in the context of criminal proceedings
against another website owner, who had no connection to Yildirim
or Yildirim's website.'02 Yildirim argued that Turkey's blocking
order "infringed his right to freedom to receive and impart
information and ideas."' 03 In the Chamber judgment, the Court
explained that the Internet is "one of the principal means of
exercising the right to freedom of expression and information" and
that the blocking of access to Google sites breached Yildirim's
right to freedom of expression.'0 4 The Court found that, according
to Article 10, the measure was not "prescribed by law," did not
meet any "legitimate aims," and "was [not] necessary in a
democratic society to achieve such aims."' Accordingly, the
European Court of Human Rights concluded that Turkey had
violated Article 10 of the European Convention.'0 6
99 See Press Release, Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, App. No. 3111/10 Eur. Ct. H.R.
458 (2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=003-
4202780-4985142 (confirming that a chamber judgment is not a final judgment until a
request to refer the case to the Grand Chamber of the Court is refused).
100 Factsheet- New Technologies, May 2011, EUR. CT. H.R., available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/CA9986CO-BF79-4E3D-9E36-DCCFlB622B62
/0/FICHES Nouvelles technologies EN.pdf (discussing Jankovskis v. Lithuania, No.
21575/08, which dealt with the prison authorities refusal to give a convicted prisoner
access to the Internet).
1ot See Press Release, supra note 99 (discussing Yildirim v. Turkey, No. 3111/10,
which deals with the Turkish authorities blocking of Google sites).
102 Id
103 Id
104 Id.
105 Id. (providing that neither the Google websites nor Mr. Yildirim's own website
were the subject of the Denizli Criminal Court proceedings and that Turkey failed to
consider "whether it had been necessary to block all access to Google Sites" and
"whether a less far-reaching measure could have been taken," such as "block[ing] access
specifically to the site in question").
106 See id.
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Other than Yildirim, however, there is a dearth of case law
with regard to Internet access. Despite the lack of case law
specifically addressing the right to Internet access, the European
Union has taken at least some action that the HRC should look to
as a model for enforcing the freedom of expression online.
One example illustrating how the European Union reacts to
restrictions on Internet use in a member state concerns the French
three-strikes law.'0 7 The three-strikes law is an anti-piracy
measure that was proposed by former French president Nicolas
Sarkozy, punishing individuals who illegally download music and
film by disconnecting their access to the Internet "for up to a
year."' In response, the European Parliament adopted a
resolution requiring member states to reject legislative measures
"conflicting with civil liberties and human rights and with the
principles of proportionality, effectiveness and dissuasiveness.""O9
In supporting this view, the European Parliament concluded that
"disconnecting alleged copyright infringers would violate the
fundamental rights and freedoms of Internet users."'" Thereafter,
the French Constitutional Council struck down the three-strikes
law as a violation of the right to "free access to public
communication services online," which the Council deemed to be
a human right."' The French legislature nonetheless passed an
amended version of the three-strikes law, providing that a judge
would oversee the process of issuing Internet disconnection
orders.1'2 The public has generally opposed the three-strikes law,
but the amended three-strikes law continues in force today.'
107 Top Legal Body Strikes Down Anti-Piracy Law, France 24 (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://www.france24.com/en/200906 I 0-top-legal-body-strikes-down-anti-piracy-law-
hadopi-constitutional-council-internet-france.
108 Id.
109 European Parliament Rejects Graduated Response, LA QUADRATURE Du NET
(Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.1aquadrature.net/en/european-parliament-rejects-graduated-
response.
110 Legal Authority Kills French Three-Strikes Law, TORRENTFREAK (June 10,
2009), http://torrentfreak.com/legal-authority-kills-french-three-strikes-law-090610/.
I Top Legal Body Strikes Down Anti-Piracy Law, supra note 107.
112 Nate Anderson, France Passes Harsh Anti-P2P Three-Strikes Law (Again), ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 15, 2009, 3:59 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/09/france-
passes-harsh-anti-p2p-three-strikes-law-again/.
113 Legal Authority Kills French Three-Strikes Law, supra note 110.
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Current events suggest that the general distaste towards the
three-strikes law because of interference with the right to freely
use the Internet may ultimately dismantle the three-strikes law."4
First, only one person has been convicted and fined after having
ignored the three warnings, and even then, his Internet was not
forcibly disconnected."' Second, Aurelie Filippetti, the French
Minister of Culture, disparaged the three-strikes law for having
failed to fulfill "its mission of developing legal content offerings,"
for being too expensive in having to track down and warn
violators, and for mandating a sanction-the "suspension of
internet access"-that is "disproportionate . .. against the goal."" 6
Although, thus far, she has only committed to cut down on
funding for the three-strikes law and its related government
agency,"' her response demonstrates a shift in the administration
of French President Francoise Hollande against the three-strikes
law.
Hollande himself has a history of opposing the three-strikes
law. When the three-strikes law was circulating through the
French Parliament prior to his presidency, Hollande, a member of
parliament, voted against it and voiced his desire to repeal it."'
Although Hollande's stance on the issue during his presidential
campaign implied something more along the lines of a "partial
repeal," his plan sought to "remove the threat of connections being
cut off if people are accused several times of downloading
copyrighted material."I' While Hollande was not elected as
president solely on the basis of his vote against the three-strikes
law, his position on this issue, along with his other views, have
I14 See, e.g., Glenn Peoples, France's Hadopi: 2 Convictions, I Fine, 1.25 Million
Warnings Since 2009, Billboard Biz (Dec. 31, 2012, 1:52 PM), http://www.billboard.
com/biz/articles/news/ 1483616/frances-hadopi-2-convictions- I-fine- 125-million-
warnings-since-2009.
115 Id.
116 Robert Andrews, France Will Cut Funding to its Piracy Police, PAIDCONTENT
(Aug. 3, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://paidcontent.org/2012/08/03/france-will-cut-funding-to-
its-piracy-police/.
17 Id
118 Glyn Moody, Leading French Presidential Candidate Would Repeal HADOPI
But Keep Net Surveillance, TECHDIRT (Oct. 26, 2011, 10:35 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111023/05483716480/leading-french-presidential-
candidate-would-repeal-hadopi-keep-net-surveillance.shtml.
119 Id
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nonetheless made him popular among voters. 120
Recently, a French Ministry of Culture commission on digital
content and cultural policy released an interim report on the law,
concluding that "[t]he efficiency of Hadopi is hard to evaluate
precisely."l 21 The final report will not be released until March
with the commission's official recommendations but, importantly,
the testimony gathered from consumer groups for the initial study
was critical of the efficacy of the law.12
This example demonstrates how Koh's vertical approach-as
exemplified by the movement of the European Parliament, the
French Constitutional Council, digital rights groups like La
Quardrature du Net, and the public-may have contributed to the
slow dismantling of the three-strikes law.123  Time will tell
whether the Hollande Administration will get rid of the three-
strikes law altogether, or at least the aspect of the law that
interferes with the freedom of Internet use. This example also
demonstrates that internalizing an international norm into
domestic law is a slow process. At the same time, the result is
indicative of positive international steps towards upholding
freedom of Internet use.
Additionally, the European Parliament has enacted resolutions
to encourage participation from private companies in the
promotion of Internet freedom.124  For example, one such
120 See Nick Farrell, Sarkozy Rout Could Kill Three Strikes Law, FUDZILLA (Apr.
23, 2012), http://fudzilla.com/home/item/26891-sarkozy-rout-could-kill-three-strikes-law
(indicating that the three-strikes law may have contributed to Francois Hollande's higher
poll ratings to the detriment of Sarkozy's ratings).
121 Aymeric Pichevin, Hadopi, France's Anti-Piracy Law, Could Be In Jeopardy
Following Commission Report, BILLBOARD Biz (Dec. 14, 2012, 3:03 PM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1483889/hadopi-frances-anti-piracy-law-
could-be-in-jeopardy-following-commission.
122 Id
123 Note that France recently made its first conviction under the three-strikes law.
However, Jr6mie Zimmerman, from the French digital rights organization La
Quadrature du Net, indicated that this was an anomalous case such that "[i]f this guy
hadn't self-incriminated, he would have never been fined." According to Zimmerman,
"[tlhe best remedy against Hadopi is to say, 'I didn't do it!' Cyrus Farivar, France
Convicts First Person Under Anti-Piracy Law (Even Though He Didn't Do It), ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 13, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/france-
convicts-first-person-under-anti-piracy-law-even-though-he-didnt-do-it/.
124 European Parliament Resolution of 18 April 2012 on the Annual Report on
Human Rights in the World and the European Union's Policy on the Matter Including
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resolution advocates for accountability from companies in the
European Union that create products and services used in
furtherance of Internet censorship.'2 5 This action is particularly
important because along with North America, Europe "controls a
substantial proportion of supply and demand in both
telecommunications and Internet markets," giving European
policy "considerable leverage in the global telecommunications
and Internet markets." 2 6  In return, some of the large
telecommunications operators in Europe have requested "timely
advice and support" from European governments when faced with
"external pressure to shut down or misuse communications
networks" in other countries.127 For example, European
telecommunications operators in Cairo have said that their staffs
were "threatened with military force" to comply with
censorship.128
In 2008, the European Parliament passed the European Union
Global Online Freedom Act (EU GOFA), which proposed to treat
"[i]nternet censorship by national governments as a trade
barrier." 29 This may require American Internet companies, such
as Google, and European Internet companies, such as France
Telecom, to block their services in "authoritarian states."l30
Additionally, if the Council of Europe adopts the measure, the
European Union will have to "classify any Internet censorship as a
barrier to trade, and would require that the issue be raised in any
Implications for the EU's Strategic Human Rights Policy, EUR. PARL. Doc. P7_TA-
PROV(2012)0126, TT 121-26.
125 Id.
126 Briefing Paper, Ben Wagner, Researcher, European University Institute, to
Directorate-General For External Policies, European Parliament, After the Arab Spring:
New Paths for Human Rights and the Internet in European Foreign Policy, 1 3.2,
EXPO/B/DROI/2011/28 (July 4, 2012), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument-EN&file=75431.
127 Id.T3.3.1.
128 Id
129 Sami Ben Gharbia, EU: Towards a European Global Online Freedom Act,
GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY (Mar. 5, 2008), http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/
2008/03/06/eu-towards-a-european-global-online-freedom-act/.
130 Eric Bangeman, EU May Begin Treating 'Net Censorship As a Trade Barrier,
ARs TECHNICA (Feb. 28, 2008, 12:07 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2008/02/
eu-may-begin-treating-net-censorship-as-a-trade-barrier/.
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trade negotiations."'"' This proposal was one of the first to bind
Internet censorship to trade.13 2 While the Council of Europe has
not yet adopted the EU GOFA,13 3 various transnational actors
continue to advocate for the measure.134 It is, therefore, probable
that protecting the freedom of expression on the Internet will one
day be internalized within the legal structures of member states,
and a measure similar to, if not the same as, the EU GOFA may be
adopted.
Furthermore, the European Union has promoted dialogue and
training on the issue of Internet freedom and Internet censorship
for years.' 3  For example, the European Union has planned to
"participate in the training of bloggers, online journalists, and
human rights activists on how to circumvent [I]nternet censorship
and cyber-attacks" in 2012.136
D. How the Efforts of the European Union May Translate to
Uphold Human Rights Online in Countries that Censor or
Restrict Internet Access
Even though the European Union has not set up a
comprehensive and effective mechanism to protect the
fundamental rights relating to the Internet, its actions illustrate
how the international community at large may protect Internet
usage and enforce fundamental rights in noncompliant states.
31 Id.
132 Id.
133 Gharbia,supra note 129.
134 See Karel Janssens & Thomas De Meese, Towards a European Global Online
Freedom Act, CROWELL MORNING, Sep. 09, 2008, http://www.crowell.com/
NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/Electronic-Communications-IT (explaining that EU
GOFA was proposed by a "cross-party alliance of [the members of European
Parliament]" including Jules Maaten, Chistofer Fjellner, Edward McMillan-Scott); see
also Members of European Parliament Urged to Support Global Online Freedom Act's
European Version, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (July 16, 2008),
http://en.rsf.org/european-union-members-of-european-parliament- 16-07-
2008,27851 .html (explaining that Reporters Without Borders supports the EU GOFA).
135 See generally Olaf B6hnke, Europe's Digital Foreign Policy, European Council
on Foreign Relations, 9 (Sept. 2012), available at http://intemethumanrights.org
/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/2012-09-11 ECFR Digital-Foreign-
PolicyBoehnkeenglFINALl.pdf (noting European Union efforts to instruct media
and activists concerning cyber security and Internet censorship).
I36 See id
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Many countries currently employ Internet censorship, thereby
restricting Internet access within their countries.'
Turkey, as part of the Council of Europe, has been subject to
the European Covenant of Human Rights and to the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights when claims against it were
brought on the grounds of Article 10 of the European Covenant of
Human Rights.' One issue dealt with the Information and
Communication Board of Turkey's (BTK) attempt to adopt a
mandatory filtering system that purported to "protect families"
from harmful content.'39 The filtering system originally required
users to choose from four filtering profiles upon the purchase of
the Internet service.'4 0 The BTK had broad discretion to "include
on the black list any website that it believed to be harmful" and the
filtering criteria was "arbitrary." 4 ' When the IPS Communication
Foundation challenged the filtering system at the highest
administrative court in Turkey and approximately 50,000 people
protested against it in public, the BTK adopted the modified
filtering system, which was optional, but not mandatory.142  The
modified filtering system, however, was still "arbitrary," with the
"child filter" blocking "access to several websites advocating the
theory of evolution as well as the website of Richard
Dawkins .... [And blocking] access to Facebook and ...
YouTube, in addition to ... the Armenian minorities' newspaper,
AGOS."l 43  Another complaint requested that the BTK filtering
system be abolished on the grounds that it lacked legal basis.144
137 See, e.g., Bauml, supra note 28, at 705 (discussing that China has an "advanced
and sophisticated system of censorship); see also Alex Pearlman, The World's 7 Worst
Internet Censorship Offenders, GLOBAL POST (Apr. 4, 2012) available at
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/rights/the-worlds-7-worst-
internet-censorship-offenders (providing that as of 2012, countries like Iran, China,
Cuba, Bahrain, Burma, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Estonia are arguably the worst internet
censorship offenders).
138 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2012- Turkey, 8, REFWORLD (Sept. 25,
2012), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,TUR,4562d8b62,5062e89
61e,0.html.
139 Id. at 6.
140 Id.
I41 Id
142 Id
43 Id
144 Freedom House, supra note 138, at 6.
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Although many sites continue to be blocked in Turkey, the
Internet enables users to impart and receive information in ways
that "avoid filters and blocking mechanisms."l 45 Thus, YouTube,
despite having been blocked, "remained the eighth most-accessed
site in Turkey." 46  This widespread circumvention of website
blocking gives credence to the belief that the normative behavior
of Internet users may eventually urge the Turkish legal system to
prohibit arbitrary website blocking and internalize these normative
behaviors.'4 7
Several prominent non-EU countries such as Iran and China
also restrict human rights on the Internet.148 For example, Iran has
often slowed down the Internet connection speed by slowing down
the bandwidth before and during demonstrations organized by the
opposition.'4 9 Iran has also imprisoned Internet users, some of
whom were sentenced to death.' In 2010, Iranian blogger
Hossein Derakhshan was charged with "cooperation with hostile
states, propagating against the regime, propagation in favor of
anti-revolutionary groups, insulting sanctities, and implementation
and management of obscene websites" and was sentenced to
nineteen and a half years in prison."' Similarly, Egypt blocked
Internet access for five days in 2011, resulting in an economic loss
of over 90 million dollars. 5 2 China has a complex filtering system
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See generally Koh supra note 12, at 1400-01 (describing the process of
developing internalized normative behaviors, which involves the adoption of "external
norms" into an organization's "internal value set").
148 See Nazila Fathi, Iran Disrupts Internet Service Ahead of Protests, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. I1, 2010, at A6; see also Bauml, supra note 28, at 705.
149 See Fathi, supra note 148, at A6; see also Christopher Rhoads et al., Iran
Cracks Down on Internet Use, Foreign Media WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2009) available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124519888117821213.html.
150 See The New Media: Between Revolution and Repression-Net Solidarity Takes
on Censorship, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 11, 2011), http://en.rsf.org/the-
new-media-between-revolution- 1-03-2011,39764.html.
151 Hossein Derakhshan Returns to Evin Prison, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN (Dec. 12, 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted),
https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2010/1 2/hossein-derakhshan-returns-to-evin-prison/.
152 See The New Media: Between Revolution and Repression-Net Solidarity Takes
on Censorship, supra note 150 (illustrating how important the Internet is to the global
and national economy).
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glibly called the "Great Firewall of China" that filters out specific
keywords relating to "political ideologies and historical events that
China has banned from discussion" in order to protect national
security and promote unity.153  China also has an Internet police
force, numbered at approximately 40,000 people. 15 4 In April 2005,
Shi Tao, a journalist, was sentenced to ten years in prison because
Tao sent an email to an American journalist regarding the Chinese
government's warning to journalists not to discuss the anniversary
of the Tiananmen Square massacre.'
Although there is a discrepancy between Turkey and
authoritarian regimes like China and Iran, Koh's transnational
legal process identifies ingredients that may aid all of these
regimes in internalizing freedom of expression on the Internet.156
The European Union merely provides a model in which those
ingredients are currently at work.
While sanctions, one of Koh's ingredients, are not guaranteed
to succeed, if combined with other mechanisms, norm-
internalization may occur in the future and enforcement may be
achieved.157 Sanctions may target either the technology-producing
companies or non-compliant states.'5 ' As one enforcement
mechanism, the international community can impose sanctions
"against companies selling the worst of the worst technologies,
such as those outlined by the White House for Iran and Syria in an
Executive Order on April 23, 2012."'5 As a corollary, sanctions
against the non-compliant states may also be a possible
enforcement mechanism. For example, the United States and the
EU member states have imposed economic sanctions against Iran
153 Kaydee Smith, A Global First Amendment?, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
509, 514, 517 (2007-2008); see also Bauml, supra note 28, at 705.
154 See Nils Hedberg, China: 40,000 Police Officers Monitor the Internet,
HJALMARSON FOUNDATION (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.hjalmarsonfoundation.se/
2012/03/china-40-000-police-officers-monitor-the-internet/.
155 See Smith, supra note 153, at 514-17.
156 See generally Koh, supra note 12, at 1400-08 (using the concept of internalized
normative behavior to explain why any country follows international human rights law,
or any international law for that matter).
157 See id at 1407-08.
158 See generally id (discussing the applicability of sanctions as a tool to encourage
compliance with international human rights norms).
159 Briefing Paper, supra note 126, at 19.
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over its controversial nuclear program.16 0 Recently, Iran's
currency dropped significantly.' 6 ' Although it is debatable
whether the sanctions caused the Iranian currency to drop, they
certainly played a role.'62 This rationale will be harder to apply to
economically powerful countries like China, as influential
companies like Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft want to tap into the
Chinese market.'63 Therefore, the international community needs
to ensure that these companies either have an incentive to
withdraw from China until it complies with international norms or
provide a disincentive to comply with the Chinese government's
censorship demands. Moreover, while it is difficult to anticipate
similar results in an economically powerful country like China,
sanctions, combined with other factors that Koh describes, will
increase the likelihood that even repressive regimes will
internalize and enforce the right to the freedom of expression on
the Internet.164
Moreover, even repressive regimes have an economic self-
interest in maintaining the Internet. In fact, Singapore used to
strictly control Internet content to preserve "the nation's political,
cultural and moral values," but has since relaxed controls on
160 See Scott Tong, EU, U.S. Announce Tougher Sanctions on Iran, MARKETPLACE
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/eu-us-announce-
tougher-sanctions-iran; see also Exec. Order No. 13,606, 77 Fed. Reg. 24,571 (Apr. 24,
2012) ("[Targeting persons who have operated] facilitates computer or network
disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights
abuses.").
161 See Benjamin Weinthal, Analysis: Will New EU Sanctions on Iran Count?,
JERUSALEM POST (Oct. 14, 2012), http://wwwjpost.com/lranian-Threat/news/
Analysis-will-new-EU-sanctions-on-Iran-count; see also Elad Benari, U.S. Treasury:
Sanctions Hurting Iran's Access to Global Capital, ISRAEL NATIONAL NEWS (Feb. 8,
2013), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/165020.
162 See Weinthal, supra note 161; see also Benari, supra note 161.
163 See Doug MacMillan, Google, Yahoo Criticized over Foreign Censorship,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/mar2009/tc20090312 381922.htm (explaining criticism of Google, Microsoft,
and Yahoo for censoring Chinese sites in an effort to cater to the large, growing market).
164 See Koh, supra note 12, at 1407-08 (describing five factors that contribute to a
successful sanction: (1) application of external political sanctions; (2) development of
incentives for compliance; (3) encouragement of liberal policy with regard to human
rights; (4) encouragement of adopting and internalizing international norms; (5) and,
finally, civil engagement on an international level to facilitate the internalization of
norms).
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Internet access due to its interest in e-commerce.16 5 Even though
China is an economically powerful country, China and its non-
state actors still stand to benefit from the Internet.16 6 For example,
the fact that China hesitated to block Google completely after
Google removed its Chinese domain, and rerouted it to its Hong
Kong website indicates how much China wants internet service
providers like Google operating within its markets. 6 1
Furthermore, because of the accessibility of software that bypasses
government filtering systems, controlling the Internet is expensive
and difficult.168 Thus, it may be more economically advantageous
for countries like China to instead use their resources to negotiate
with foreign business actors in exchange for access to their market
via the Internet.169 Some analysts have also argued that China may
decrease its control of the Internet "in order to attract foreign
capital, technology, and knowledge."' 7 0 Further, some have
argued that due to the increasing number of domestic websites, "a
bust due to competition and lack of financial backing" is
probable.' 7 ' Thus, China could "incur costs" if foreign investors
do not invest in China because of its Internet censorship.'72 At a
certain point, China could find that its interest in attracting foreign
investors and foreign companies outweighs its interest in
censorship.
Koh's liberty theory is the weakest rationale when applied to
repressive regimes.'7 3 Repressive regimes are unlikely to comply
under the liberty theory based on rule-legitimacy since repressive
regimes, presumably, do not feel that freedom of expression on the
Internet is a legitimate human rights issue.1' Liberty theory based
on political identity is also a weak rationale when dealing with
repressive regimes. Unlike most of the European Union,
165 Eko, supra note 10, at 477.
166 See Tsai, supra note 48, at 418.
167 See Bauml, supra note 28, at 727-28.
168 See Eko, supra note 10, at 483.
169 See id
170 Husain, supra note 31, at 44.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See Koh, supra note 12, at 1401-02 (providing that states engage in a cost-
benefit analysis whether to comply with international law).
I74 See id
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repressive regimes are unlikely to be liberal democracies.175
Regarding the communitarian rationale, economically
powerful countries may ignore the value of the United Nations, of
which they are a part.176 However, states generally want to have
''a positive reputation for cooperation" in order to gain goodwill
and have a voice among the global policy-making body. 77 Again,
although this rationale is weaker when dealing with repressive
regimes, there is still a possibility that some states will support the
freedom of expression on the Internet merely because the United
Nations declares it a human right.
Finally, the vertical story of enforcement involves a variety of
actors at the domestic and international level.'7 ' As illustrated in
the example of the European Union, there are many state and non-
state actors that advocate for the freedom of expression on the
Internet as a human right within the international community. 9
Although these actors have more obstacles in voicing their
opinions, they nonetheless may set into motion a process of
internalizing the freedom of expression online.'s For example,
the media coverage of the imprisonment of individuals such as
Hossein Derakhshan'8 ' and Shi Tao 82 has been sufficient to raise
outrage among domestic and international communities, and
among various actors including bureaucrats and non-state
organizations."' Although outrage, in and of itself, cannot change
norms in repressive regimes, outrage of actors at all levels may
pressure those regimes to modify their institutions.'8 4 As Koh
175 See id.
176 See id. at 1406.
177 Tsai, supra note 48, at 427-28; see also supra notes 48-51 and accompanying
text.
178 See Koh, supra note 12, at 1409-12.
179 See supra Part III.D.
180 See generally Koh, supra note 12, at 1400-01 (explaining the process of norm
internalization).
181 See Hossein Derakhshan Returns to Evin Prison, supra note 15 1.
182 See Smith, supra note 153, at 514-17.
183 See Hossein Derakhshan Returns to Evin Prison, supra note 151; see also
Smith, supra note 153, at 514-17.
184 Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 18 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999)
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
states, international human rights law is, after all, enforced "by
people like us, by people with the courage and commitment to
bring international human rights law home."'8 5
Taking Koh's transnational legal process and its associated
factors into account, and examining the ways in which these
situations have played out within the European system as a model,
it is certainly possible that even repressive regimes will internalize
freedom of expression on the Internet sometime in the future.
However, the important factors with regard to repressive regimes
will be to focus on economic benefits and the desirability of
maintaining a good reputation and presence within the
international community.
One concern is that the United Nations may not be in the
position to emulate the European Union.'18  The European Union
receives "substantial powers from member states and is
exclusively competent in certain areas, and is thus able to affect
directly the lives of EU citizens."' 87 Furthermore, EU member
states are less likely to be repressive regimes, that would be most
affected by UN-backed protection of fundamental freedoms
regarding the Internet. Despite these differences, the other
rationales underlying the transnational legal process indicate that
norm-internalization on an international level is possible.' 8
Additionally, the United Nations is the appropriate party to guide
this norm-internalization process because of its economic, social,
and political influences in the international sphere.
IV. Conclusion
Even though EU member states have not fully internalized the
fundamental freedoms relating to the Internet, the European Union
has adopted resolutions and declarations that set out freedom of
(discussing how various groups, such as domestic actors and organizations in a
repressive regime, seek out international actors "to try to bring pressure on their states
from outside").
185 Koh, supra note 12, at 1417.
186 See Noelle Quenivet, Binding the United Nations to Human Rights Norms by
Way of the Laws of Treaties, 42 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 587, 619-20 (2010).
187 Id.
188 See generally Koh, supra note 12, at 1400-08 (explaining how internalized
norms can be a factor in determining compliance with international law, including
international human rights law).
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expression on the Internet as human rights. The European Union
has also proposed that violation of those rights may act as trade
barriers, and has actively participated in ongoing discussion on
enforcements mechanisms. Although blocking of certain sites and
Internet censorship still exists to a limited degree in some EU
member states, actions taken by digital rights groups, by
individuals who file complaints with the European Court of
Human Rights against offending states and the European Union
itself have represented positive steps toward internalizing the
protection of human rights on the Internet.
Although the HRC's recent Resolution is certainly one step
towards norm internalization, it suffers from lack of an
enforcement mechanism. Therefore, the HRC should look to the
European Union's actions for alternative ways to put pressure on
repressive regimes if the HRC hopes to enforce freedom of
expression on the Internet against noncompliant states.
Furthermore, the HRC should look at the European Union's
actions within the framework of Harold Koh's transnational legal
process theory because the transnational legal process better
explains how fundamental freedoms relating to the Internet may
be enforced. While the norm internalization process is gradual,
the HRC will likely make positive progress towards norm
internalization by looking to the European Union's actions within
the framework of Koh's transnational legal process theory as a
model.

